Washington, DC: Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations Headquarters, USAF, November 1993. Corder asked for an additional thirty minutes. USAF doctrine stresses centralized control and decentralized execution. If you would just tell us what part of the road you want, and when you are going to be there, we will just block it off. And so, when we started moving south, the Army brought targets to us. He stated, "Now, I didn't say, 'Now wait a minute. Although Essence of Decision is primarily about decisionmaking at the national level, his frameworks can help us understand the decisionmaking process at other levels as well. A second reason the CINC and the airmen developed close relationships was the theater�s dependence on airpower, especially in the early days of Operation DESERT SHIELD. "Operation DESERT STORM," March 1991 (approximate). Storm Command. But, I don't think that... Only the airpower air heads talk about no need for ground forces and all that bullshit. Not only did the ground/air forces fail to integrate to optimize effectiveness, but the different aviation/air forces failed to integrate as smoothly as could be desired. It is possible to package joint combined arms the same way as counter air. That is a big deal. The question therefore arises: to what extent was the effectiveness of joint operations in the Gulf War influenced by these individual service perspectives? Ground forces, on the other hand, with much larger numbers of tactical weapon systems, cannot always be controlled at as high a level as air forces. 3. With this understanding, some conclusions are offered improve future joint force employment. Sacred Honor: A Biography of Colin Powell. We simply understood each other, worked out any disagreements that our staffs may have had. But what he was unable to do was adequately change his perspective from a tactical to a joint theater outlook. Perla, Peter P., Swider, Gregory, and Fox, Christine. I might write an enormous amount of sorties, and every seven minutes I�d have airplanes up doing various things. Airman pride themselves on flexibility; and rigidly stating how one is going to conduct war seems contrary to how many air leaders want to conduct operations. The suborganization took clear precedence over the larger organization in a number of instances. This report recommends that the Marines take advantage of every joint billet available with quality officers, improve joint training and education, and make equipment interservice compatible. General Yeosock, on the other hand, generally coordinated and communicated between the CINC and his corps commanders. And I said, "Well, that's fine, except we have other fish to fry.". Franks commented. The Navy�s trouble was that they tried to do it honestly and write just what they were going to fly. We're trying to exercise, work, operate, learn, an interact with other service systems such as AWACS, and in different areas such as Korea. They wound up on the left flank of the VII Corps who had just made its 90 degree turn to the east. Regardless of the specific nomenclature of the organization at the time, it is important that the senior officers of each component making the tactical decisions on the battlefield are working closely with one another. That is in the Air-Land Battle portion. It was through other commanders.". This uncoordinated ground effort could have resulted in friendly aircraft attacking them. (Names protected under non-attribution. In hindsight, one Marine officer freely admits his actions were not correct and essentially not the way business should be conducted. and that the Marines could be better represented by the MARCENT Commander being physically located at Riyadh. Builder, Carl H. The Masks of War. Our rule was you had to have two separate, independent, physics-based ways of identifying the guy as hostile before you could shoot him. "An Army and Air Force Issue: Principles and Procedures for AirLand Battle, A Perspective of Operational Effectiveness on the Modern Battlefield". You do common sense things and don't worry about doctrine. So he paid a price for that. Deptula, David. Well, who's it going to be?� " Corder stated that Schwarzkopf said, "�It�s going to be my vice, Waller,� to which Horner retorted, �Fine.�". In your wildest stretch, you could not claim they were doing what the CINC wanted us to do. This will result in fires being placed along the entire battlefield instead of just the front. Somebody thought there was a blue-on-blue, then they rode it just as hard as they could. He believed the Marines could integrate better and be more effective by separating COMMARCENT and Commander, IMEF. Fort Leavenworth, Ks, November 1991. The ultimate deep battle has been strategic attack, but the USAF has also placed significant emphasis on interdiction. In December 2001, Dato’ Aziz together with Datuk Kamarudin Meranun, Tan Sri Tony Fernandes and Dato’ Pahamin Ab Rajab, acquired struggling domestic airline AirAsia, and with the help of Conor McCarthy, relaunched it as a pioneer of budget travel in Asia, building AirAsia into the world’s best low-cost carrier. This model explains the behavior of large organizations as the result of bargaining among players in the organization. It is possible for individual actions to fall inside more than one model simultaneously. As it was, when the war ended, the Iraqis had 600 extra tanks to attack the Shiites and the Kurds with which they wouldn't have had otherwise. Shortly after this upgrade, the wing moved its bombers to another B-52G base, Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico from July through October 1959 while major repairs were made to Loring's runway. I thought I could keep the enemy�s heads down to help our guys approach unobserved. ), US Marine Corps Interview Transcripts. That's the way the commanders tended to use it. To make a long story short, he said he agreed, and his decision, which I think he had already formulated, was that he was going to really be his only ground combat commander. Now both the corps were moving. The air planners were concerned with gaining air superiority and striking targets, not winning the air kill competition. One year later, after a decision by the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, the wing began preparations to close Loring. Norfolk Naval Base, Va., 23 March 1994. With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Dependent on the carrier, the opinions differed to a degree. 42nd Air Base Group (later 42nd Combat Support Group, 42nd Logistics Group: 1 September 1991 – 30 June 1994, 1 October 1994 – 30 September 2002, 42nd Medical Group (later 42nd Tactical Hospital): 25 February 1953 – 1 July 1959, 42nd Operations Group: 1 September 1991 – 31 January 1994, 811th Medical Group (later USAF Hospital, Loring; 42nd Strategic Hospital; 42nd Medical Group): 1 July 1959 – 30 June 1994, 1 October 1994 – present, 42nd Air Refueling Squadron: 18 January 1955 – 1 September 1991, 69th Bombardment Squadron: 26 February 1943 – 10 May 1946 (detached 26 February – c. 15 April 1943); 25 February 1953 – 1 September 1991, 70th Bombardment Squadron: 26 February 1943 – 10 May 1946 (detached 26 February – c. 15 April 1943); 25 February 1953 – 25 June 1966, 106th Reconnaissance Squadron (later, 100th Bombardment Squadron): attached c. 6 January 1944, assigned 1 February 1944 – 11 December 1945, 390th Bombardment Squadron: 20 March 1942 – 27 January 1946, 407th Air Refueling Squadron: 2 July 1968 – 1 October 1990, 23rd Munitions Maintenance Squadron: 1 July 1960 – 1 October 1972, 42nd Airborne Missile Maintenance Squadron: 1 November 1962 – 30 September 1974, 42nd Armament & Electronics Maintenance Squadron (later 42nd Avionics Maintenance Squadron): 25 February 1953 – 31 October 1990, 42nd Comptroller Squadron: 30 September 1994 – present, 42nd Field Maintenance Squadron: 25 February 1953 – 1 September 1991, 42nd Munitions Maintenance Squadron: 1 October 1972 – 1 September 1991, 42nd Operations Squadron (later 42nd Operations Support Squadron): 1 October 1994 – c. September 2002, 42nd Supply Squadron: 1 October 1961 – 1 July 1963, July 1974 – 1979, 42nd Transportation Squadron: July 1974 – 1979, 2192nd Communications Squadron: 1 October 1990 – 1 September 1991, 4030th USAF Hospital: 15 February – 1 October 1954 (attached to 42nd Air Base Group after 1 April 1954), 1 January – 1 December 1958, 1 January – 1 July 1959, 886th Chemical Company, Air Operations (Medium & Heavy): attached August 1944 – 1945, McChord Field, Washington, c. 18 January 1942 – 15 March 1943, Cyclops Airstrip, Hollandia, New Guinea, Netherlands East Indies, 24 August 1944 (air echelon), Mar Airstrip, Sansapor, New Guinea, Netherlands East Indies, 24 August 1944 (ground echelon), c. 15 September 1944 (air echelon), Puerto Princesa Airfield, Palawan, Philippines, March 1945, Limestone Air Force Base (later Loring Air Force Base), Maine, 25 February 1953 – 30 September 1994, Maxwell Air Force Base (later Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base), Alabama, 1 October 1994 – present, North American B-25 Mitchell, 1942, 1943–1945, Boeing KC-135A Stratotanker, 1957 – c. 1985, Boeing KC-135R Stratotanker, c. 1985–1992, This page was last edited on 13 January 2021, at 18:45. Glosson would prepare a list of targets which he believed fell in line with the CINC's guidance and directives. On the third and fourth days, however, FSCL placement became a matter of contention. Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Research Center. The decision reached and action conducted achieve maximum benefit for minimum cost, and the best solutions possible (the most rational decision/action). The US corps is the largest tactical unit on the battlefield. As much as the CINC stressed striking and destroying the Republican Guard, less than 10% of all strike sorties were directed at them. The Marine aircraft are generally best suited for short range and close battle. Doing well by one�s service does not always equate to doing well by one�s country. US Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1991. If the component headquarters had been co-located, communication and direct interaction between the USAF and the USMC commanders and staff would have increased significantly. And so I talked to one of my Army counterparts, Bill Welch. The joint integration of deep fires may be divided into two main areas for the Gulf War: deep fire integration during the air campaign and deep fire integration during the ground campaign. There were no compelling reasons for the US Army to look much deeper. Since then I have talked to Rudy Kwortinvich down at Fort Rucker. United States military officers must continuously make serious efforts to maintain a national outlook on their service to country. They were corps assets. A flag officer Deputy JFACC assigned directly to the corps would have two major advantages--rank and regular direct access to the JFACC. Anthology and Annotated Bibliography. This was increased to half the wing's aircraft in 1962. No matter how negative members other services felt toward the United States Air Force, or the manner in which joint combined operations were being conducted, there remained a positive respect for Horner and his Model I decisions and actions. [42] When Boeing KC-135A Stratotankers were assigned to the 42nd Air Refueling Squadron in 1957, the wing became an all-jet force. After interviewing all the senior participants regarding this issue, this author believes the fratricide did not occur. Decision implementation is often complex because there is often room for different interpretations of the decision. The undersigned certify that this thesis meets masters-level standards of research, argumentation and expression. To those that had day to day dealings with the Air Force it became readily obvious that the JFACC�s primary concern was to coordinate the efforts of theater aviation, deconflict airspace, and increase the efficiency of the air campaign. That is, analysis results will not be accurate with respect to the "real world/entire organization," but only accurate in regards to the simplified organization. 3. Its doctrine states, "A MAGTF commander must be prepared to articulate the most effective operational employment of his MAGTF in a joint or combined campaign." They began moving north at a high speed in what looked like a "movement to contact". After a period of time, Arthur realized the SPINS was effectively blocking the less restrictive ROE from being implemented. Chapter 1 (this work lacks page numbers), Cohn, et al. Third, the Marines wanted the IMEF commander to be able to report directly to the theater CINC. National Guard Almanac. [27] From this base on Palawan the group attacked shipping along the China coast, struck targets in French Indochina, bombed airfields and installations in the Philippines, and supported ground operations on Mindanao. [35] In January 1955, the 42nd Air Refueling Squadron was activated and assigned to the wing. [47], Cold War tensions between the United States and Russia came to a head in October 1962. Research Paper submitted to the Faculty of the Defense Intelligence College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for JPM 604, March 1993. [15] After additional training and the conversion of the 70th squadron to the B-25, the air echelon of the group headquarters and two squadrons moved to Carney Field, Guadalcanal in June and joined the ground echelon which had arrived the previous month. Meisner, Arnold. If organizational survival becomes an issue which influences the decision, Model III occurs. Then, at midnight, one o'clock in the morning, we discussed how could we link the F-111�s and the Apaches together in a coordinated, continuous attack and shutdown Highway 8 completely--mass helicopters and F-111�s the rest of the night. Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff United States Army, 1993. Page 238. The fourth reason was inadequate Navy representation in Riyadh. While the Army recognized the importance of both corps primacy and the corps commander, it is just beginning to understand the "new" corps implication in regard to airpower application. US Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1994. It must be noted that General Moore could not have conducted operations as he did without Boomer�s support. It is somewhat ironic to note that the bulk of coalition strike sorties assigned "push CAS" missions were employed more like BAI than CAS. He did not need operational control of the joint/combined air forces to effectively direct their tactical employment. They had every intention of taking the battle right to Saddam Hussein. The policies and procedures of the departments and agencies of the Department of Defense will be integrated to the maximum extent practicable. Stan Arthur came to see me because the F-14 guys wanted to use the Phoenix. The bottom line is the different services need to develop effective joint doctrine, hardware and training procedures. In US Army doctrine, the corps commander is responsible for countering all threats, regardless of battlefield boundaries, which may affect his unit. He believed the US Army had a fear of integrating into the ATO and that that fear became a hindrance to joint operations. Corder, John A. An officer�s stand is determined by personal priorities and perceptions, goals and interests, stakes, deadlines, and implications of the issues. Horner might have overcome this Model II outcome with more forceful direction to his staff. But the Marines were not the main thrust of the battle--VII Corps was. This trust was gained through competence and loyalty. This was not the only way the Marines manipulated the air targeting process. Reflecting on Operation DESERT STORM, Franks commented. Suggested command improvements are discussed in the concluding chapter. de la Billiere, Sir Peter. And even during the first few days, the Iraqi fighters were handily dispatched by the coalition air-to-air teams. We expected the FSCL to come down the Euphrates and then run down the north-south canal just to the west of Basrah and then drop down onto the top of Kuwait, due south. Briefing to Army General Officer. General Moore did not believe in the ATO or the JFACC concept. The wing's 42nd Air Refueling Squadron provided air refueling for aircraft flying Chrome Dome missions. And it was different from every other ship. US Army direct fire weapon systems, supported with artillery, generally provided adequate fire for its needs as far as close-in battle was concerned. We talked about some rather sticky issues in the beginning, but we had very good conversations. Corder noted: It was about three weeks before the ground war started. For example, even after Waller put together his targeting board, Glosson would provide information or brief the CINC prior to Waller's briefing on the next day�s targeting. "The Targeting Process in Operation DESERT STORM," 4 March 1991. This perception had an operational impact. They could bypass the agreement that was made early on. USAF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Horner sat on the right of Schwarzkopf. One, some of the targets were not valid. The result was less than optimal information flow and somewhat degraded operations. Horner had a great deal of respect for Boomer and the Marine units. Some individuals become, to varying degrees, "organizationally brainwashed.". They believed the less restricted BVR ROE was unnecessary. Osceola, WI. In Korea, General Walton Walker and General Matthew Ridgeway, commanders of the Eighth Army, met almost daily with General Earle Partridge, who commanded the Fifth Air Force. One reason for the difference in BVR ROE is the possible repercussions of a enemy aircraft breaking through to an aircraft carrier. As a result, the USAF developed and procured extensive identification systems to avoid or reduce fratricides. Just let them do what they want to do." Individuals engaged in a narrower mission focus are prone to thinking in Model II terms. When we get within a few days of the ground war starting he is going to be begging you to let Navy and Air Force with PGM's come into those boxes to kill those divisions." I had essentially no interaction with Glosson or anyone else in the Air Force. If we would have focused it all up close, you would have stopped the momentum of the ground attack, because of fratricide and so forth. So, we got it all sorted out, but it lingered. Date of interview 25 March 1991. In regard to perceptions and decisionmaking on ships, he noted the following: In the case of Desert Storm, each one of the ships had a different perspective on the war than every other one. Horner noted another possible problem with joint force integration. I contacted the ABCCC [Airborne Command and Control Center] and was given a visual reconnaissance mission. Boomer, Walter E. Interview with P. Mason Carpenter at the Naval Annex, Washington ,DC, 23 December 1993. Lewis, Richard B. H. "Reflections on Desert Storm: The Air Campaign," 20 December 1990. And, I believe, favorably from his. However, the forward location of Loring made it an ideal for the squadron's slow propeller-driven Boeing KC-97G Stratotankers to rendezvous with faster Boeing B-47 Stratojets crossing the Atlantic. The US military needs to move towards a much more fluid, continuous, simultaneous application of combat power, and away from very stilted, big, thick target folders, three day planning targeting cycles, and a lot of lines on a map. Well, nobody had ever done it. The Gulf War validated much of USAF doctrine and underwrote the claims that airpower can be the decisive force in warfare. Interview with P. Mason Carpenter. While plenty of aircraft were made available to the US Army, very little integration was preplanned. They moved the 101st Air Assault Division forward and established a base near Ali al-Salem airfield. Let�s not rush it. And the FSCL remained at a relatively fixed range, out to about 15 kilometers. The USAF even back-tracked, discouraging the use of the procedure. Organizations acting within Model II will often lack flexibility and far-sightedness. We never exploited the Apache like we could have prior to the ground war starting. So with "Semper Fi" in mind, at the time, there was no guilt for their actions. Action in Model I is accomplished by rational choice. And he agreed. The Air Force understood that.". Tape number 1455. One of the first frustrations encountered by VII Corps leaders was the JFACC�s refusal to recognize and implement procedures for Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI), a concept born and developed in NATO. He observed, "When Waller got into it, I noticed an improvement in our ability to communicate priorities to support the land concept of maneuver". Davis, Richard G. The 31 Initiatives. The USMC air was especially lacking in precision capability during the battlefield preparation. The unrestricted BVR ROE, however, were never really implemented. In Italy during World War II, the Fifth US Army and the XIIth Air Support Command enjoyed collocated command posts. While the BAI issue appeared to be relatively unimportant in the Gulf War, it is actually very important. He wanted to retain those and save them for the corps commander. This standardization will result in quicker integration and reduced Model II behavior. He maintained direct interaction with part of his ground forces, the USMC. That happens to include an element of air in support. The decision reached and the action taken is based primarily on normal organizational operating procedures or organizational doctrine. Individuals or organizations operating without the availability or benefit of all the necessary information to make rational decisions and operate within Model I will be considered operating within Model II. These senior officers include Generals Buster Glosson, Chuck Horner, Walt Boomer, Fred Franks, John Corder, Robert Russ, Michael Ryan, John Yeosock, and Admirals Stan Arthur and Hank Mauz. In that way, the 1st Cavalry Division, the Big Red One, the Brits who had never worked with the US air before, would have the opportunity to crack this. "After Action Report," 8 March 1991. Since officers cannot operate according to Model I without adequate information, it is imperative for senior leaders to ensure it is provided. But as Ringo Starr sang, "I don�t ask for much, I only want trust and you know it don�t come easy". However, in the early 1980�s the US Army began developing doctrine that looked deeper than just a few miles behind the battle lines. [1] In December 1972 the wing suffered its only loss of the war when a B-52 crewed by members of the wing was hit by a surface-to-air missile over North Vietnam. An advocate can provide dynamics, alternative ideas, and research initiative for worthwhile endeavors which might not otherwise exist. Luck also noted that although the USAF did not follow joint doctrine pertaining to Battlefield Air Interdiction and Close Air Support, the way the USAF employed its air worked, and worked well. Finally, only a few days before the war, the Navy belief that it was being slighted by the USAF on BVR ROE was forwarded to Arthur, who confronted Horner and pressed for a more liberal BVR ROE policy. Deptula felt Glosson was too hard on himself. Failure in this instance can degrade the individual in the eyes of other officers and result in a loss of effective power/influence. The organizational chart of AirAsia Group displays its 65 main executives including Tony Fernandes, Aireen Omar and Tassapon Bijleveld × We use cookies to provide a better service. Navy perceptions of USAF Model III behavior contributed to their willingness to help the Marines circumvent targeting, effecting operations. It is all too easy for commanders to be mired in doctrine and past methods of conducting business, losing the benefits of innovation which lead to flexibility. In other cases the targets were mobile and had moved. It would have been nice to have some F-111F�s, but none were available. Repeated skip-bombing attacks, with quarter-ton bombs driven into the face of a terrific barrage of automatic weapons fire from the warships, were observed by the Mitchell crews and the naval crews aboard the patrol plane to have accomplished the following results: Enemy losses-one light cruiser left burning and dead in the water; two direct hits scored on a destroyer, causing large explosions and certain destruction; damaging hits or near misses on a 300-foot freighter. But the actions were made with the best of intentions in support of his organization, which he believed in. The reason he was doing it, and I believe he laid this out in his discussion, was, "We don't need to cause any internal doctrinal strife while this thing is going on. Horner then took the message to Waller and said, "I want an apology. Standard operating procedures and routines dominate. Eventually we gave them boxes. O�Connell, Edward O. The basic rule was if the FSCL had to be moved because soldiers would otherwise be killed, the US Army was to just move it and then inform the JFACC staff. Note that effective upward and downward communication is essential to a Model I process. I�ll never forgive him for that. This was the most significant failure of the FSCL issue. On 20 July, the group made a successful attack on Japanese combatant ships: "[E]ight Mitchells of the 69th Squadron ... on all night shipping alert were dispatched to intercept the Tokyo Express making its way down the Slot . They had to get it into the ATO because they needed the deconfliction, they needed the call signs, the air space management, and so on and so forth. First was when the XVIII Airborne Corps reached the Euphrates River. The commander of this element should work directly for the corps commander and have regular direct access to him. On the other hand, many in the USAF see the US Army firepower beyond the FSCL as minuscule when compared to tactical fixed-wing airpower and, generally, a hindrance to executing the most effective employment of airstrikes. This again results in less than optimum actions. This is what we are going to do tomorrow. In addition, the CINC worked regularly with Glosson, who with the JFACC planning staff, directed tactical operations. A minute later the Special Forces Representative came running back yelling, "Don�t shoot, they�re our guys". However, the corps and Waller sometimes nominated targets within Iraqi units assessed below 50%. But where joint doctrine ends, it is paramount the individual services and commands develop specific integration procedures. : Harper Collins, Zondervan Publishing House, 1993. The JFACC should have found a way to work more directly with the corps commanders. In reality, the target selection was being accomplished by Lt Colonel Bill Welch from the Battlefield Control Element (BCE) and Colonel Sam Baptiste, a USAF air planner. While this bargaining improved integration, it should not have been necessary. However, when opposing military forces are more equal, and the enemy more of a match, this synergism becomes essential to having the most effective combat operations. In the Southwest Pacific, General MacArthur teamed up very well with General Kenney. Through preplanning, the commander can then be more flexible with his tactics and firepower once engaged. US Army Field Manual 100-5 AirLand Battle is an Army document and one that has not been formally accepted as standard procedure throughout the Air Force. Arthur was unable to spend the time necessary to get the less restricted BVR ROE implemented. I'm not the brains behind Schwarzkopf's success, but I tried wherever possible to emulate that relationship, because, that is the way to fight modern war. ", Arthur was somewhat disappointed about the limitations placed on the USN aircraft. And, as a result, many, many things that could have spiraled out of control in terms of arguments and disagreements and that then would have been placed on the plate of the CINC (who needed nothing else on this plate) never occurred. ), US Marine Corps Interview Transcripts. There is a legitimate concern by the USAF that the US Army will focus on the close in battle at the expense of strategic attacks and interdiction, which are often the best places to apply limited air assets. This study has demonstrated that command relationships at the top generally worked well in the Gulf War.